Eric Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics
Nobel Laureate Eric Maskin was an NSF Graduate Fellow from 1972 to 1975. During this time, he was completing his master’s and PhD degrees in mathematics at Harvard University. Soon after his graduation, Maskin began to form an intellectual partnership with Partha Dasgupta, which continues today. Their first work together focused on implementation theory. From there, they then branched into examining the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous games. Their most current work concerns voting methods. Dr. Maskin is also researching income inequality and repeated games.
Maskin is perhaps best known for his work in mechanism design theory. His pioneering work in this field led to being awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2007. He shared the prize with Leonid Hurwicz of the University of Minnesota and Roger Myerson of the University of Chicago.
Since 2000, Dr. Maskin has been the Albert O. Hirschman professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study. Before his current position, he was employed as Louis Berkman Professor of Economics at Harvard University and as a professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Dr. Maskin has received many awards and honors, including: an honorary degree from Cambridge University in 1977; recipient of Economic and Social Research Science Research Council Grants from 1978 to 1995; elected Fellow of the Econometric Society in 1981; awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship from 1980 to 1981; Galbraith Teaching Prize, Harvard University 1990 and 1992; Honorary Fellow, St. John’s College, Cambridge, elected 2004; Erik Kempe Award, 2007; Honorary Professor, Tsinghua University 2007. He has also served as an editor or associate editor for many journals, including Economics Letters, Social Choice and Welfare, Games and Economic Behavior, and International Journal of Game Theory.
Selected works (in chronological order):
- Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting
- The Unity of Auction Theory: Milgrom's Masterclass
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions
- On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts
- Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to the market
- Auction Theory with Private Values